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Abstract:  We introduce for any TU-game, a new TU-game referred as its associated 
solidarity game (ASG). The ASG gives more power to the grand coalition by reducing the 
payoffs of others coalitions. It comes that, the Shapley value of the ASG is the Solidarity 
value of the initial game.  
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1- Introduction and preliminaries 
 
Let N={ }n,...,2,1  be a finite set of n players called the grand coalition and let Γ  denote the 
linear space of the n-person transferable utility game V  on N. { }RVV N →=Γ 2:/ . For 
any subset (coalition) in N, )(SV  is the payoff (worth) of coalition S when all the players 
in S collaborate and 0)( =∅V . 
A value ( ))(),...,(),()( 21 VVVV nψψψψ =  on Γ , is a vector-valued mapping: nR→Γ:ψ , 
which uniquely determines, for each Γ∈V , a distribution of wealth available to the players 
1,2,…,n through their participation in the game V . 
Many values have been defined in the literature and we will focus our study on two of 
them: The Shapley and the Solidarity Value, in view to establish a relation between those 
values.   
 
 
2- Main Results and discussion 
 
Let us recall formula of the Shapley and the Solidarity Value. 
 
Solidarity value 
To define the solidarity value, one compute for any non empty coalition S , the quantity: 
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    where Sk = is the cardinality of the coalition S . 
It is clear that )(SAV is the average marginal contribution of a member of the coalition S .  
The solidarity value is the unique value (A.S.Nowak and T.Radzik, 1994) of the form 
( ))(),...,(),()( 21 VVVV nφφφφ = where for i = 1, 2, …, n, 
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Shapley Value 
The Shapley value is the unique value (L.S. Shapley, 1953) 
 
( ))(),...,(),()( 21 VVVV nϕϕϕϕ = where for i = 1, 2, …, n, 
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Definition 2.1: (The solidarity game of a TU game) 
Let V  be a game in Γ , the associated solidarity game (ASG) of  V  is the game Vˆ Γ∈  
defined as: 
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The gameVˆ , refereed as solidarity game relatively to the gameV , is obtained from V  by 
reduction the gap between the payoffs of coalitions of the same cardinality. In fact, given 
two coalitions S  and 'S  with equal cardinality k, if )'()( SVSV ≥ the gap between their 
payoffs in the game V  is )'()( SVSV −  while in the game Vˆ  this gap becomes
1
)'()(
+
−
k
SVSV
, that is k+1 times less. Secondly, the payoff of the grand coalition is 
unchanged in the game Vˆ  while all others coalitions of cardinality k<n have their payoff 
divided by k+1 and hence, considerably reduced.  
This mechanism reduces the power of the coalitions and gives more importance to the 
grand coalition (that is the all society) in Vˆ relatively to V . Since all players belong to the 
grand coalition, each of them takes advantage of its increasing importance in the new game. 
In particular, this shows that, the Shapley null-player, if there is one, in the initial game V
will change status in the associated solidarity game. Every player, at least, through the 
grand coalition, participates substantially in the new game. This consideration does not 
mean that the players will benefit from the passage of a game to its associated solidarity 
game in the same level. When use the Shapley value rule, some of the players will gain by 
the change while others will loss; it depends on the structure of the coalition’s payoffs in 
the initial game. But what is sure is that every player will have a substantial importance 
relatively to the Shapley marginal contribution rule.  
It is interesting to examine the case where n equal 2. Suppose that N={ }ji, : 
• If { } { }jViV = , Shapley rule attributes the same value to the two players in the 
game V  as in the game Vˆ . 
• If { } { }jViV > , the Shapley value is: 
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The associated solidarity game of V  is : {} {}
2
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And its Shapley value is: { } { }
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One can easily observes that, player i  who is the leader player in the game V  is still 
leading in the associated solidarity game Vˆ but the gap between the payoff of the two 
players has been divided by 2 in Vˆ . So that the Shapley value of Vˆ  is obtained from the 
Shapley value of V as a transfer of the quantity { } { }( )
4
jViV −
 from the leader player to the 
second player. 
The aim of this paper is to determine in the general case ( )2≥n  the relation between the 
Shapley value of a game and the Shapley value of its associated solidarity game. Before 
investigate our object, let us look at some examples. For simplicity, we take n=3.  
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As first example, let consider the unanimity game Tree Brothers introduced by Nowak and 
Radzik in 1994. That is, N={ }3,2,1 ,   { } 0=iV   { } 12,1 =V     { } { } 03,23,1 == VV   and
{ } 13,2,1 =V . 
The Shapley value of  V  is 
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
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The solidarity associated game of V is : { } 0ˆ =iV   { }
3
12,1ˆ =V     { } { } 03,2ˆ3,1ˆ == VV . 
{ } 13,2,1ˆ =V . It is interesting to note that Vˆ  is no more a unanimity game. Player 3 who was 
a Shapley-null player has changed status; he substantially contributes in the game via the 
grand coalition. The Shapley value of Vˆ is 
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, that is exactly the solidarity value 
of V found by the authors. In this case, this Shapley value ofVˆ , could be interpreted 
relatively to the Shapley value of V  as a transfer of value from the two brothers 1, 2 to their 
disabled brother 3. Note that this transfer maintains the rank of the values. But do these 
properties always valid? 
The second example involves the case where a player who has the greatest Shapley value in 
the initial game V  obtains a more great value in the associated solidarity gameVˆ : 
N={ }3,2,1 ,   { } 41 =V  { } { } 032 == VV   { } 52,1 =V     { } 53,1 =V   { }
2
173,2 =V  and
{ } 213,2,1 =V . 
The Shapley value of the game V  is    
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And the Shapley value of the game Vˆ is     
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This shows that, the player 1 who is the richest by the Shapley value rule of V is richer in 
the Shapley value rule of its associated solidarity gameVˆ . 
 
Another interesting example is the game N={ }3,2,1 ,  { } 21 =V  { } 42 =V  { } 03 =V  
  { } 62,1 =V     { } 53,1 =V   { } xV =3,2 . 
Where, for 32 << x , we have the Shapley value which verifies: )(2 Vϕ < )(1 Vϕ   and )ˆ(2 Vϕ
> )ˆ(1 Vϕ . 
 
The considered examples reveal in particular that, except the case where n=2, there is not an 
order relation between the Shapley value of a player in a game V and his Shapley value in 
the associated solidarity game Vˆ  of V . This leads again to question on the justification to 
refer to the gameVˆ as solidarity one regard to the initial gameV . In other words, one can 
ask itself in which sense the game Vˆ may be considered as a solidarity game relatively to 
the gameV ?  
An other answer of this question, in addition to the fact that the importance of the grand 
coalition (the whole society) is reinforce in the associated solidarity game relatively to the 
initial game,  is given in the following theorem and constitutes the state of our main result: 
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Theorem 2.2: For a given game Γ∈V  on N={ }n,...,2,1 , the Shapley value of its associated 
solidarity game Vˆ coincides with the solidarity value of the initial gameV ; that this: For 
any player ∈i N, )ˆ(Viϕ = )(Viφ .    
 
3- Proof 
 To prove our result, we need to rewrite in an extensive way, the classical formula of the 
Shapley value (see equation (2)) and the Solidarity value given in equation (1). This is the 
formulation of the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 3.1: For a given game Γ∈V , The Shapley value and the solidarity value can be 
expressed as: 
1) Shapley value: ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑ ∑
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2) Solidarity value: ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑ ∑
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Proof 3.2:  
1) Shapley value 
It is well kwon that ( ) ( ) { }( )∑∑
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 Given a coalition S with a fixed cardinality equal k ( )nk ,...,2,1= , we have two possibilities: 
- either iS ∋  and then the coefficient of )(SV is (n-k)!(k-1)!/n! 
- or Si ∉  and then S may be obtain as { }iSS −= '  with 1' += kS ( )nk < , hence the 
coefficient of  )(SV is - ( ) !)!11(!)1( nkkn −++−  =- ( ) !!!1 nkkn −− . 
This imply,  
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      And thus, (3) holds.▪ 
 
2) Solidarity value. 
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A similar reasoning as above lead us to evaluate the coefficient of  )(SV  for a given 
coalition S with a fixed cardinality equal k ( )nk ,...,2,1= .  
Suppose kS = , 
 If  Si ∉ , then { }jSS −= '  with 1' += kS  and the coefficient of  )(SV  is : 
               - ( ) ( ) ( ) !1!11!)1( nkkkn ++−+− = - ( ) ( ) !1!!1 nkkkn +−−  
 If Si ∈ , we will directly have )(SV with coefficient ( ) ( ) !/!1! nkkn −−  in one hand, and we 
will also obtain S as { }jSS −= ' with 1' += kS and SJ ∉ ( there is n-k such possibilities) 
which imply that , in second hand, we will find )(SV in the summation  
-
( ) { }( )
∑
∈ +
−−−
'
1
'
!
!!1
Sj k
jSV
n
kkn
 and then obtain the second coefficient of )(SV :  
 -
( ) ( )
1!
!!1
+
−−−
k
kn
n
kkn
. 
Summing the two coefficients lead to: 
 ( ) ( ) !/!1! nkkn −− - ( ) ( )
1!
!!1
+
−−−
k
kn
n
kkn
= 
( ) ( )
( ) !1
!1!
nk
kkn
+
−−
  .   
    Finally, we can write: 
      
( ) ( ) ( )
∑ ∑ ∑
=
=
∋
=
∉ 









+
−−
−
+
−−
=
n
k
kS
iS
kS
Si
i SVk
kknSV
k
kkn
n
V
1
)(
1
!!1)(
1
!1!
!
1)(φ
 
               = 
( ) ( ) ( )
∑ ∑ ∑
−
=
=
∋
=
∉ 









+
−−
−
+
−−
+
1
1
)(
1
!!1)(
1
!1!
!
1)( n
k
kS
iS
kS
Si
SV
k
kknSV
k
kkn
nn
NV
 
                                                                                                                                 ▪ 
 
 
  Proof of the theorem 3.3: According to equation (4),  
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  inserting the definition of Vˆ , 
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            Taking into account equation (4), we directly have, 
 
          
)ˆ(Viϕ = )(Viφ                                                                                            ▪ 
 
Clearly, 
n
NV )(
 is the average wealth of the players in N and the lemma reveals that Shapley 
value and the Solidarity value give a similar treatment to )(NV . The formulas given in 
equations (3) and (4) could be useful for a direct computation of the Shapley and the 
Solidarity value, especially when n is not great.  
  
4- Conclusion 
 
The solidarity game Vˆ associated to an n-person transferable utility game V is obtained as a 
transformation of V  so that the new game Vˆ  reflects a kind of solidarity between players. 
This kind of solidarity could be apprehended as the solidarity in sense of Nowak and Radzik 
(1994). We have shown that, in this sense, the solidarity could be explained by either 
considering the Solidarity value in place of Shapley value or considering the associated 
solidarity game instead of the initial game. This in particular reveals that, a Solidarity value 
could be obtained as a Shapley value.  
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